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NORMATIVE AND POLICY RESTRAINTS
ONWAR
William V. 0 'Brien*

RESTRAINTS ON WAR: STUDIES IN THE LIMITATION OF ARMED
CONFLICT. Edited by Michael Howard. Oxford: Oxford University
Press. 1979. Pp. 173. $16.95.
HUMANITARIAN POLITICS: THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF
THE RED CROSS. By .David P. Forsythe. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 1977. Pp. 298. $17.95.
Restraints on war arise from two basic sources. First, political
and military policies, by defining the ends and means of war, determine whether war becomes "total" as in World Wars I and II or
"limited." Second, normative principles and prescriptions may limit
both ends and means of war. These normative limitations may derive from morality or from positive law. Ideally, policy and normative restraints on war complement and support each other. When
the restraints converge, there is great opportunity to ameliorate the
destruction and suffering of war. However, political and military
policies and normative guidelines do not always converge. The true
task of the law of war is to maximize such convergences.
The interrelation of the possible sources of restraint on war is
therefore a matter of perennial importance. The relationships both
within and between the two broad categories of normative and policy restraints are important. Political policy restraints are essential to
the control of military policy, while military policy must find its justifi.cation in the service of political policy. Morality stands above
policy as an external source of restraint. Yet, moral prescriptions
divorced from the realities of policy may become irrelevant. Law is
the meeting place for morality and policy. Ideally, the law of war
reflects both sound moral principles and the realities of political and
military policies.
The two books here reviewed recognize and deal with this complex of relationships. In Restraints on War_, Michael Howard and a
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disti,nguished group of contributors address four categories of restraints on war and sometimes show their interrelations. Unfortunately, the contributors do not always realize the promise of
Howard's introductory chapter in developing the connections between politics, military policy, morality and law. Still, the ingredients for such analyses are there. David Forsythe's Humanitarian
Politics analyzes the policy implications of a body of law which is
conspicuously grounded in moral values. In a thorough study of the
International Committee of the Red Cross (I.C.R.C.), Forsythe emphasizes the political dimension of efforts to support and enforce humanitarian law and to advance moral principles and initiatives not
yet clearly provided for in that law.
This review will consider Restraints on War .first. After describing Howard's introductory essay, it divides the book into two sets of
essays: those dealing primarily with normative restraints on war,
and those dealing primarily with policy restraints. Forsythe's monograph will be discussed last, partly in the light of the issues raised in
the evaluation of Howard's volume.
I

Howard, Chichele Professor of the History of War at Oxford, is
one of the foremost military historians and analysts of our time. In
the opening essay of Restraints on War, Temperamenta Belli: Can
War be Controlled?, Howard builds on the central concept of control
over the military instrument of policy. Howard first distinguishes
force from violence: "War consists of such deliberate, controlled,
and purposeful acts of force combined and harmonized to attain
what are ultimately political objectives" (p. 3). He then observes
that, "Military activity thus carries an intrinsic imperative towards
control; an imperative derived from the need to maintain order and
discipline, to conserve both moral and material forces and ensure
that these are always responsive to direction" (pp. 3-4). Nevertheless, "[t]hese military criteria . . . will not necessarily coincide with
the dictates of humanity" (p. 4). Recalling the countervalue strategies of General Sherman in the American Civil War, Howard concludes that "the military principle of 'economy of force' may
sometimes conveniently coincide with the dictates of transcendent
moral values, but there is little historical justification for assuming
that this will always be the case" (p. 4).
Howard's point that control is the essence of good military policy, but that political/military control does not always produce the
results enjoined by normative or humanitarian restraints, is an im-
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portant one. Supporters of the law of war naturally tend to emphasize its coincidence with enlightened political/military policies and,
conversely, the self-defeating effects that often result from manifestly
illegal behavior. This is a prominent theme, for example, in the 1976
Air Force pamphlet, AFP 110-31, International Law - The Conduct of Armed Conflict and Air Operations. 1
Howard next sketches the development of the law of war as a
source of external restraint on war. He reviews the traditional distinction between the jus ad bellum, the law governing recourse to
armed force, and the jus in be/lo, the law governing the conduct of
war. The moral doctrine of Just War produced the1ils ad bellum,
while Grotius and subsequent framers of positive international law
developed the jus in be/lo. In this survey Howard identifies the underlying characteristics of the political system and of limited wars
that made development of these normative restraints possible.
In this century, when political and military realities changed to
produce modem total war, the material bases on which both the
moral just war doctrine and the international law of war had been
grounded were destroyed. Total war between societies in conflict
produced strategies that capitalized on modem military technology,
strategies such as the countervalue strategic bombing policies of the
RAF in World War II. These tactics represent an almost total divergence between political/military policy and the moral/legal principles of proportion and particularly of discrimination or the
immunity of noncombatants and nonmilitary targets from direct intentional attacks. Neither morality nor law could make much of a
stand against the necessities of total war. In the post-World War II
era, the logic of political/military policy alone could revive limited
war theories and policies. Thus, prudential rather than normative
considerations gave hope of restoring restraints on war. At the same
time that total war between nations has destroyed traditional normative restraints on war, wars of national liberation within nations have
been waged with an "ends justifies the means" spirit that tends to
make them particularly bitter and unrestrained, further endangering
the prospects for normative regulation of war. The remaining essays
in the book review these developments and assess the future prospects for restraints on war.
1. DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, INTERNATIONAL LAW -THE CONDUCT OF ARMED
CONFLICT AND AIR OPERATIONS, Air Force Pamphlet 110-31, at 5-8-5-10 (Nov. 1976).
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A. Normative Restraints on War

Geoffrey Best takes the lead in developing the first of Howard's
themes, the restraint on war by normative principles and prescriptions. Best, Professor of History at the University of Sussex, is a distinguished scholar whose recently published Humanity in Waifare 2 is
an important contribution to the growing contemporary literature on
the law of war. Best's essay, Restraints on War by Land before 1945,
traces the ,evolution of the war from its customary form in the great
era of limited war, 1648-1914, to its codification in the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907. Best displays a profound understanding
of the doctrinal developments in international law from the seventeenth to the twentieth centuries. Beyond that, however, he displays
a commendable interest in military sociology, a subject that must be
studied in connection with efforts to translate law into terms meaningful to those to whom it is directed. Best writes:
What soldiers actually think about conduct in war, and how their
thoughts affect their conduct, is an area of this subject which has so far
been very little explored. The legal and official literature, understandably enough, takes no notice of the possibility that within armed forces
a kind of sub-culture or 'private' culture may exist, the norms and tendencies of which may conflict with those prescribed in the manuals of
military conduct, etc. . . .
The question then for the historian who wishes to embrace all relevant possibilities is: what are the relations between this private military culture which will lay its persuasive claims upon the thinking and
behaviour of at least the regular soldier who has been acclimatized to
it, and the public political culture from which his army as a whole
ostensibly derives its standards and instructions? [P. 24.]

Best pursues this issue with respect to the law and practice governing treatment of prisoners of war, pillage, and the protection of
women. He finds that, even in the nineteenth century, the law of war
was more effective in protecting soldiers than civilians. And as the
twentieth century unfolded, the possibility of protecting civilians by
the law of war was drastically reduced by the advent of total war.
Thus the political/military policies that produced limited wars also
made possible the developments of the principles of discrimination
(or non-combatant immunity) in positive international law. But, as
early as the American Civil War, the phenomenon of societies totally
mobilized for war rendered plausible Sherman's proposition that the
way to win such a war is through direct intentional attacks on the
mobilized society itself. Best traces this development through the
Franco-Prussian War to the two World Wars.
2. G. BEST, HUMANITY IN WARFARE (1980).
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Best concludes with a brief examination of the phenomenon of
popular resistance to military occupation and the resultant emergence of guerilla war as a major form of modem conflict. This phenomenon perpetuates civilian identification with war efforts and
assures the continuance of political/military policies aimed at civilians and their property, policies that remain at odds with the aspirations of those who would revive the principle of discrimination. On
the whole, then, Best finds discouraging prospects for the coincidence of policy with morality and law in war. Indeed, he ends by
asking, "has the civilian, as liberal Europe used to know him, become extinct" (p. 36)?
The same theme of divergence of policy from law is pursued by
Bryan Ranft, formerly Professor of History at the Royal Naval College, in his essay, Restraints on War at Sea before 1945. Ranft points
out that much of the eighteenth and nineteenth century law of war at
sea sought to negate the most decisive capability of naval warfare,
namely, the ability to interdict and destroy vital merchant shipping.
Ranft first recalls the long history of efforts to protect neutral shipping and neutral goods and to require that naval blockades be effective and not "paper." Once again the material environment affected
the state of law, for the greatest progress in regulating naval warfare preceded the development of modem industrialized states.
Once it became clear that modem states were critically dependent on
overseas imports and hence vulnerable to blockades, the pressures
on the law of naval warfare became increasingly great. The last
great attempt to salvage the traditional law of naval warfare at the
1909 London Naval Conference failed utterly in the face of belligerent naval policies in the First World War. By the end of that war,
virtually all of the law of naval warfare, established with great effort
over the preceding centuries, fell before the demands of total war
policies. Ranft recalls that both the Allies and the Germans justified
this process by the concept of reprisals. Indeed, the decline and fall
of this once central part of international law is traceable directly to a
reprisal spiral that traded illegal act for illegal act until there was no
law left.
Ranft concludes with a brief but critical point that might be
called "technical necessity." World War I had shown the impossibility of treating submarines as though they were capable of observing
the same law as surface warships. All pretense of uniform treatment
was abandoned in World War II, when anti-submarine weapons systems, particularly maritime aircraft, made submarines extremely
vulnerable. Accordingly, the interwar efforts (such as the 1922
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Washington Conference, the 1930 London Conference, and the
London Submarine Protocol of 1936) to codify a law regulating submarine warfare failed completely. Ranft points out once again that
the law is likely to collapse where there is an unreasonable gap between the demands of law and the material characteristics of the regulated subject matter.
The same point is made with equal emphasis by Donald Cameron Watt, Professor of International History, London School of Economics, in his essay, Restraints on War in the Air before 1945.
Indeed, Watt sees a pattern in the process by which efforts to regulate aerial bombardment failed:
The first [step] is the attempt of an advanced but still belligerent
society to devise restraints and inhibitions on the use of a weapon the
technological development of which was so constantly to be out of
phase with men's concepts of its use. The second is the manner in
which those concerned with the problem moved from optimism to extreme pessimism in their attitudes to the weapon and the technology
that produced it. The third is the decline of overall moral standards
and the dwindling of the ethical horizons of those responsible from a
general to a purely national scale. [Pp. 58-59.]

Watt also traces the origins of the Royal Air Force doctrines of
strategic bombing and force development that predetermined, in
great measure, the policies of the Second World War. The early
prophets of air power in Britain, of whom Lord Hugh Trenchard
was the foremost, held out a strategic deterrent policy as the best
defense posture~ Indeed, this RAF doctrine greatly resembles the
"more bang for the buck" policies of the Eisenhower Administration
as it initiated nuclear strategic deterrence. Trenchard and others
proposed that the RAF both adopt what we would now term
countervalue policies, and develop capabilities to threaten a potential aggressor with a devastating assault on his cities. Although the
RAF never achieved such a deterrent capability, it did proceed to the
policy of "area" attacks on German cities in World War II, attacks
that completely violated the traditional moral/legal principles of
proportion and discrimination.
Watt's brief review of air law and strategy before 1945 (actually,
before 1939) leads him to generalize that, as this Reviewer has also
observed,3 customary law grows and conventional law is viable
where they have an adequate societal and material basis. In the first
phase of the three-step process Watt describes in the quotation
above, such a basis for law seems to exist. But, as the second two
3. See O'Brien, Legitimate Military Necessity in Nuclear War, 2
(1960).

WORLD POLITY

35, 82-100
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phases unfold, law tends to take the form of conventions that are
increasingly out of harmony with the realities of modem warfare until finally, in the third phase, the "ethical horizons" of those responsible for war shift from an international to a national scale.
It should be added that Watt's essay and, to a lesser extent, those
of Best and Ranft, suffer from the Editor's apparent mandate to stop
at the Second World War. Best and Ranft do make important points
about the practice in that war and its implications for the law of war,
but Watt does not project his analysis beyond the tentative days of
aerial combat during the "Phoney War'' before the fall of France.
His comments on the realization during the rest of the war of the
trends he has traced in RAF and U.S. Air Force strategic bombing
practice are sorely missed.
The last essay in Restraints on War, Wars ofNational Liberation
and War Criminality by G.I.A.D. Draper, Professor of Law at the
University of ·Sussex, is the most detailed in its legal analyses.
Draper begins by picking up one of Howard's themes, the relation
between the jus ad helium and the jus in be/lo. He reminds us that
the emphasis on just cause for resort to war under the jus ad helium
has historically conflicted with the insistence of the jus in be/lo that
both sides in a war must observe its rules. This conflict abated in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as the moral concept of just war
declined and no substitute jus ad helium developed to distinguish
legal from illegal belligerents. It was in this age of secular humanitarianism that much of the jus in be/lo was codified. However, starting
with the League of Nations Covenant and the Kellog-Briand Pact, a
new positive lawjus ad helium was established. This new law distinguished aggressors who violated the prescriptions "outlawing" war
as an instrument of policy from lawful belligerents engaged in wars
of collective security and/or defense. Draper emphasizes, however,
that the temptation to discriminate against aggressors with respect to
rights and duties under thejus in be/lo was resisted. The 1949 Geneva Conventions, like the 1907 Hague Convention IV, 4 "are imbued with humanitarian principles, and reject any idea of their
4. Hague Convention of 1907 Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague
IV), Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention of the Condition of Wounded,
Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217,
T.I.A.S. No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516,
T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
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unequal application based on the legality or illegality of the 'cause'
for which the belligerents have resorted to armed conflict" (p. 139).
Recently, however, a new 'just war" concept has arisen which
threatens the principle of equal application of the jus in hello. This
new just war approach is a product of the importance given to the
principle of self-determination by Third World nations and, ironically, of long-overdue efforts to apply the rights and duties of the jus
in hello to participants in intranational conflicts.
To begin with the second factor, many commentators have observed a gap in the jus in hello insofar as participants in civil wars or
internal conflicts are concerned. The only conventional law applicable to such conflicts has been the common Article 3 of the four 1949
Geneva Conventions. This Reviewer and others have long argued
that there is a need for the law of war wherever there is a war in the
material sense (j.e., widespread and prolonged combat carried on for
political rather than criminal purposes). The goal of international
law should be to increase the applicability of the law of war to
noninternational conflicts.5 The Diplomatic Conference on Humanitarian Law, 6 1974-1977, pursued this goal by drafting a Protocol to
the 1949 Geneva Conventions explicitly addressed to noninternational armed conflicts.
Draper's account soon reveals a disturbing development in the
work of the Diplomatic Conference. The Third World states,
cheered on by eleven nonvoting National Liberation Movement
(N.L.M.) delegations, sought to proclaim and implement the principle of self-determination. This principle, which had been a common
theme of Third World struggles for independence, already had been
proclaimed repeatedly in international human rights conventions
and General Assembly resolutions. 7 Nevertheless, the Third World
5. See, e.g., Baxter, Forces far Compliance with the Laws of War, American Society of
International Law, Proceedings of the 58th Annual Meeting 82-92, 97 (article, panel discussion, and co=ents by William V. O'Brien) (1964).
6. The full designation for the Conference is the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts. It
should be noted that this designation, in addition to being somewhat pretentious and overlong,
is confusing. Traditionally, the law of war was divided into the "Hague Law," which dealt
with means and methods of warfare as well as with humanitarian protection of prisoners of
war and civilians, and the "Geneva Law," which dealt exclusively with humanitarian protection. The 1977 Geneva Protocols deal with both Hague and Geneva subjects and it is mislead•
ing to label them "humanitarian" only.
7. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 2, includes among purposes and principles of the organization the development of "friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of
equal rights and self-determination of peoples". The principle of self-determination is reaffirmed, inter alia, in the U.N. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples adopted by the General Assembly December 14, 1960, in G.A. Res. 1514, 15
U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1961), and in Articles 1 of both the U.N.
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states wanted to concretize the right of self-determination through
formal recognition of the belligerent rights of N.L.M.s that are still
fighting for self-determination. Draper explains:
The Third World States were not slow to see that a major political and
a possible juridical advantage might be obtained, at one move, by securing the insertion of a provision in the scope, Article, I, of Protocol I,
whereby the struggles of peoples against colonial, alien, and racist regimes should be included as situations to which the Conventions of
1949 and Protocol 1 would be applicable. By orthodox legal thinking
such struggles were internal armed conflicts to which the Article 3,
common to the Conventions of 1949 and Protocol 2 might be applicable. Once such 'peoples' struggles' for the selective purposes mentioned were ingested within the scope of Protocol I, they assuredly had
no place in Protocol 2. The two Protocols had been drafted on the
basis of mutual exclusion. For the National Liberation Movements
and the Governments which supported them and who commanded the
majority of votes, this was a political objective as manifest as it was
desirable. [P. 146.]

As a result of Third World pressures, Article 1(4) of Protocol I,
although designated as applying to international conflicts, became
the source of belligerent rights for revolutionary forces hitherto not
covered by any international law of war except the common Article
3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Under Article 1(4), Protocol I
was said to apply, inter alia, to:
armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of
their right of self-determination, as enshrined in the Charter of the
United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International Law
concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. 8

The discussions preceding the adoption of this language indicate that
very specific situations were meant to be covered by Article 1(4) of
Protocol I. These include wars of national liberation against Israel,
South Africa, and Portugal. Since the drafting of the Protocol, internal changes in government led Portugal to dissolve its African colonial holdings and remove itself from what might be termed the warsof-national-liberation "Hit List" (my term, not Draper's). That
leaves only Israel and South Africa. Needless to add, the Third
World states voting for Article 1(4) understood that they would not
now or in the future be found guilty of "colonial domination" or
International Covenants on Human Rights annexed to G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp.
(No. 16) 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967), reprinted in 61 AM. J. INTL. L. 861 (1967).
8. Protocol Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, opened
for signature December 12, 1977, UN Doc. A/32/144, Annex l (1977) [hereinafter cited as
1977 Geneva Protocol I], reprinted in 16 INTL. LEGAL MATERIALS 1391 (1977).
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"alien occupation" or of maintaining a "racist regime." However,
there is no reason to doubt that new villains may be added to the
"Hit List," possibly including the United States.
If the 1977 Geneva Protocol I becomes accepted in international
legal practice, Article 1(4) will resolve the issue ofrecognition of belligerency in intranational wars in an awkward and discriminatory
fashion. Most noninternational conflicts will be governed by Protocol II, which is vastly inferior to Protocol I as a convention regulating belligerent conduct (most notably, Protocol II fails to institute
the protections for prisoners of war that are guaranteed to POWs in
international conflicts). But hostilities termed "wars of national liberation" against Israel and South Africa will be treated as international conflicts, and belligerent revolutionary forces in these nations
can claim the full benefits of Protocol I and, indeed, of the 1907 and
1949 Hague and Geneva Conventions. Under this approach, PLO
terrorism in Israel is an international conflict covered by Protocol I,
while a Kurdish revolt against Iraq or Iran is a noninternational conflict that entitles the rebels only to the lesser protections of Protocol
II.
In addition to its discriminatory resolution of the issue of belligerent status for purposes of application of theJils in hello, Article 1(4)
of Protocol I promises to produce a revolutionary effect on theJUS ad
helium. Under existing international law and the Charter of the
United Nations, there are only two situations in which nations can
legally resort to military force. One is during an enforcement action
under Chapter VII of the Charter, a situation that has never arisen
because of the lack of consensus among the permanent members of
the Security Council. The other is during exercise of the Article 51
right of individual and collective self-defense. If the 1977 Geneva
Protocol I is accepted, resort to force in a third situation - wars of
national liberation as defined in Article 1(4) - will be authorized by
the jus ad helium. Thus the trend of the contemporary jus ad helium
to limit severely the circumstances in which belligerents can legally
resort to armed force has been reversed. In effect, a new 'just war"
category has been added to the jus ad helium.
Having made these points, Draper observes that this victory for
Third World values is obtained at the cost of imposing duties on
revolutionary belligerents, duties that they may well be unable to
honor in practice. A typical guerrilla force prosecuting a war of national liberation will find it quite difficult to meet many of the requirements of Protocol I and of previous conventions of the jus in
hello. As Draper observes, "[o)ccupation of enemy territories, the
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conduct of hostilities, the appointment and functioning of Protecting
Powers, the penal repression of 'grave breaches' and other topics
governed by the Conventions and Protocol 1 present major difficulties when applicable to N.L.M.s" (pp. 147-48).
The Diplomatic Conference defined belligerency very differently
under Protocol II than under Protocol I. Here the Third World
states faced the possibility that they might be the target of revolutionary insurrection, and they were at pains to limit the rights of
those who might oppose their regimes by force. Article I of Protocol
II imposes a high threshold of belligerency: it requires a continuous,
high intensity conflict before revolutionary forces may profit from
even the modest provisions of Protocol II.9 Thus, to continue the
earlier example, the PLO qualifies per se for belligerent status because of its cause. Sporadic terrorist attacks that in no way satisfy
the belligerency threshold of Protocol II nevertheless suffice to qualify the PLO as a belligerent under Protocol I. On the other hand, a
Kurdish revolutionary force in Iraq or Iran would have to maintain
a broad, prolonged, uninterrupted, and highly successful guerrilla
war in order to qualify for the lesser belligerent rights afforded by
Protocol II.
Draper concludes with a consideration of the problems of enforcing the now expanded law of war. He notes that, because communist
and Third World countries have often refused to accept or cooperate
with the International Committee of the Red Cross, there may be no
certified impartial third party to monitor compliance with the law.
And because reprisals are so widely limited by explicit limitations in
the older Conventions and the new Protocols, there remains very little in the way of legally permissible retaliation to deter and punish
violations of the law. 10 Finally, Draper discusses the problems
9. 1. This Protocol, which develops and supplements Article 3 common to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949 without modifying its existing conditions of application,
shall apply to all armed conflicts which are not covered by Article 1 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of
Victims oflnternational Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) and which take place in the territory
of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other
organized armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a
part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol.
2. This Protocol shall not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions,
such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature, as
not being armed conflicts.
Protocol Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, opened
for signature December 12, 1977, UN Doc. A/32/144, Annex II (1977), reprinted in 16 INTL.
LEGAL MATERIALS 1442 (1977).
10. The issue of dwindling reprisal rights in thefas in be/lo is examined in O'Brien, The Jus
in Bello in Revo/utiona,:,v War and Counter insurgency, 18 VA. J. INTL. L. 193, 237-40 (1978).
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caused by emphasis in the Protocols on the punishment and prevention of "grave breaches." Draper calls attention to the difficulties
English municipal law has experienced in translating the concept of
punishment of grave breaches into domestic law and legal procedures. Similar problems face the United States, and they will doubtless be discussed when the Protocols are submitted to the Senate.
Draper reiterates that national liberation movements will have little
or no capability to punish grave breaches. Draper thus raises the
specter of a double standard under which the developed states are
expected to comply with an expanded body of international law and
to enforce it through appropriate domestic law proceedings, while
their potential adversaries in revolutionary or counterinsurgency
wars are measured against reduced expectations of compliance. All
of this leads Draper to question the ability of the jus in hello, at the
moment of its apparent reaffirmation and expansion, to curb the excesses of belligerents fighting under the banners of new 'Just wars."
B. Policy Restraints in War

The other three essays in Howard's book deal with the limited
war aspect of restrictions of international conflict. John C. Garnett,
Dean of the Faculty of Economic and Social Studies at the University College of Wales, Aberystwyth, presents a useful analysis of the
meaning and implications of Limited 'Conventional' War in the Nuclear Age. Along with such authorities as Robert Osgood and Bernard Brodie, 11 he prefers to restrict the term "limited war" to wars in
which the superpowers are involved and in which they deliberately
restrict the use of available military capabilities. For Garnett, the
heart of the matter is not so much the limitation of ends as of means.
When nuclear powers are directly or indirectly involved in a conflict,
limiting means may prevent escalation to nuclear war. Accordingly,
he excludes "small" and "local'' wars that do not involve belligerents
with nuclear capabilities or nuclear-capable allies from his discussion. While this is a reasonable approach, others may prefer to hold
out guidelines for limited war that can be applied in substantial
measure to all belligerents. 12
Having specified his elite concept of limited conventional war,
11. See B. BRODIE, STRATEGY IN THE MISSILE AGE 309 (1959); Osgood, The Reappraisal of
Limited War, in PROBLEMS OF MODERN STRATEGY 92, 94 (1970).
12. The Reviewer attempts a more comprehensive approach to the definition of limited
war and the development of guidelines applicable to most belligerents in O'Brien, Guidelines
for Limited War, MIL. REV., Feb. 1979, at 64. This approach will be elaborated in THe Cor-iDUCT OF JUST AND LIMITED WAR (forthcoming).
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Garnett analyzes the differences between such wars and ordinary
conventional wars. The problem for belligerents faced with a pos~ibility of nuclear escalation is to "win" enough to achieve the desired
ends but not so much as to risk nuclear escalation. A second distinctive objective in such wars is to deploy forces in such a way as to
permit effective conventional :fighting without rendering them excessively vulnerable to nuclear attack should escalation occur. The solution to the first and more important problem is to develop implicit
"ground rules" of conflict, a concept suggested in Kissinger's early
writing and elaborated by other strategic thinkers such as Thomas
Schelling. 13 One such implicit ground rule is the restriction on
bombing targets that the U.S. Air Force observed during its attacks
on North Korea and North Vietnam.
The concept of tacit rules of conflict is attractive to the proponents of both limited war and the international law of war. When
they are successfully established by the patterns of behavior and expectation in a conflict, ground rules reconcile policy with the normative goals of limiting war. As Garnett points out, however,
enthusiasm for such rules of conflict is often limited to elite proponents of limitation. Particularly in a liberal democracy, the apparent
or real sacrifices of possible military advantage resulting from such
ground rules are often viewed with concern and can generate outright opposition. The problem of limited war, then, is in retaining
enough military effectiveness to assure a reasonable probability of
success while also significantly limiting the more destructive and
.dangerous methods of warfare, and in achieving both these objectives while retaining the support of a society that wants a rapid and
successful conclusion to the conflict.
In a searching application of these concepts to NATO strategies,
Garnett explores the problems of reconciling the provision of an adequate limited defense of Europe with the maintenance of a strategic
deterrent. The paradox is that too convincing a conventional defense capability may undercut the credibility of the strategic nuclear
deterrent. There seems to be little danger that this will become a
critical dilemma in the near future, given the inadequacies of
NATO's present conventional forces vis-a-vis those of the Warsaw
Pact. Nevertheless, Garnett is quite right in raising this dilemma, for
it is one that will always confront NATO and, indeed, other similar
13. H. KISSINGER, NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND FOREIGN POLICY 140-41
LING, ARMS AND INFLUENCE (1966). The principal authorities on limited

(1957); T. SCHELwar are cited and
their suggested ground rules incorporated into limited war guidelines in O'Brien, supra note
12.
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defense alliances. Moreover, Garnett has put his finger on one of the
profound issues of modem deterrence and defense: Is it better to
maximize a nation's ability to fight limited wars in the event that
strategic nuclear deterrence fails, and in the process perhaps impair
that deterrence or to put everything into strategic deterrence in the
hope that it will be effective in preventing "limited" and unlimited
major wars?
Laurence Martin continues many of Garnett's themes in his essays on Limited Nuclear War. Martin is Vice-Chancellor of the University of Newcastle upon Tyne and one of the foremost strategic
thinkers writing today. His essay distinguishes two approaches to
limited nuclear war: (1) tactical nuclear war, and (2) strategic limited nuclear war. The first, an integral part of NATO's defenses,
plays a complicated role because of the "creative ambiguity" (p. 106)
inherent in the ability of NATO forces to opt either for conventional
nonnuclear defense policies or for conventional plus limited nuclear
defense policies. Although this creative ambiguity contributes to deterrence, it is a constant source of apprehension within NATO. The
United States fears the escalatory implications of any decision to use
nuclear weapons, even at a battlefield tactical level. The Europeans
prefer to rest primarily on the protection of U.S. strategic nuclear
deterrence and, understandably, dread the prospect of an inordinately destructive tactical nuclear defense of Western Europe. These
fears of the NATO allies are compounded by concern for the adequacy of common-control arrangements and the problems of coordinating political and military decisions and policies.
One solution to these problems, Martin suggests, might be a
"mini-nuke" strategy: tactical nuclear weapons would be employed
from the outset of an invasion (with no conventional "pause") under
policies designed to control collateral damage in the areas defended
(pp. 109-10). Still, Martin admits, the destruction would be very extensive and, most importantly, there would be no assurance that the
Soviets would cooperate in maintaining nuclear thresholds and
ground rules. This, of course, is a nagging issue in any limited war
discussion. When the enemy has equal or superior capabilities and
options, there is no assurance that he will see an interest in tacit
ground rules advantageous to the other side.
After examining the second type of limited nuclear policy - the
"limited strategic options" strategy advocated by Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger (and revived once again the summer of 1980
in President Carter's Presidential Directive 59) - Martin concludes
that the possibility of nuclear war is a permanent reality. He states:
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It would be absurd to believe that such powerful means of destruction
can be wholly and permanently divorced from political conflicts. The
question thus becomes in what way can this linkage best be handled so
as to minimize conflict and, above all, to avert all-out nuclear war.
Limited nuclear war thus presents a familiar dilemma: how to steer a
course between relatively manageable strategies for employment and
the horrifying prospects of catastrophe, so as best to preserve the deterrent and stabilizing influence of the nuclear balance? [P. 119.]

It is appropriate to end this review of Howard's book with a critique of D.P. O'Connell's essay, Limited War at Sea since 1945.
O'Connell, whose untimely death since the publication of this book
was a major loss to international and relations scholarship, was the
Chichele Professor of Public International Law at Oxford. One
might have expected a formal legal emphasis in his chapter. But although O'Connell begins by noting the need for legal justification for
use of force in self-defense, he emphasizes the kind of "ground rule"
limitations on policy stressed by Garnett and Martin. He suggests
that such limitations are to be found in three broad forms: (1) limitations on the theater of operations wherein naval force will be applied; (2) limitations on the scale of operations and the level of
weaponry; and (3) graduation of force and scale of response.
Significantly, the author of the foremost contemporary comprehensive treatise on international law in English says of the first kind
of limitation: "Whether the localization of the conflict at sea is a
legal concept or merely a matter of prudence is a moot question" (p.
126). To illustrate how open the issue remains, O'Connell contrasts
U.S. policy in the Vietnam War with India's conduct in its 1971 war
with Pakistan. The United States limited interdictory naval operations to within twelve miles of the coasts of North and South Vietnam. By contrast, India pursued its war on the high seas, thus
refusing to accept a common contemporary limited war guideline.
O'Connell offers the U.S. policies regarding mining Haiphong
Harbor as examples of the second and third types of implicit limitations distinguished above. O'Connell, a classical international law
publicist, demonstrates his cognizance of the critical importance of
limited war rules of engagement by concluding: "The intellectual
framework of limited war has thus become an essential component
of the professional activity of naval staffs" (p. 134). Thus,
O'Connell's essay again illustrates the theme of the Howard volume:
the interaction of policy and normative restraints produces a spectrum of prescriptions and guidelines ranging from political/military
rules of conflict to practices leading to customary international law
to restatements in the form of international conventions.
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David P. Forsythe's Humanitarian Politics is an extraordinarily
comprehensive and scholarly monograph on the work of the International Committee of the Red Cross (I.C.R.C.) in developing and implementing the humanitarian law of war. Forsythe, who is now a
professor of political science at the University of Nebraska, has
served as a consultant to several Red Cross agencies and committees.
His book is a significant case study of the interaction of the basic
normative and policy restraints on war. Forsythe's dedicated appraisal of the I.C.R.C.'s goals and efforts leaves little doubt about
their moral emphasis. Yet Forsythe looks beyond the organization's
efforts to maximize the automatic operation of formal humanitarian
law and of the I.C.R.C.'s role in that process: he steadfastly probes
into politics to find ways in which the I.C.R.C. can do things that
could not be agreed upon in the law-making processes of the contemporary decentralized international legal system. Forsythe's distinctive criticism is that the I.C.R.C. should recognize the limits
imposed by the need for consensus in modern international law and
should, accordingly, reach beyond the law to politics to accomplish
tasks required by morality.
Forsythe traces the development of the Red Cross movement,
places the I.C.R.C. in the context of the larger Red Cross organization in Switzerland and worldwide, and explains its functions and
basic philosophy. He also explores in detail its ad hoc diplomacy on
behalf of political prisoners, its role in the development of humanitarian international law, and its better known activities in providing
protection for prisoners of war and civilian victims of war. All of
this analysis is based on extensive study of the archives of the organization, on interviews with key personnel, and on the broader scholarly literature on humanitarian law.
Forsythe concludes his study with an analysis of three "challenges" to the I.C.R.C. in the future: the challenge of self-identification, the challenge of evaluating law and the challenge of moral
choice (pp. 231-35). Forsythe contends that the challenge of selfidentification raises the issue of whether the LC.RC. should remain
an "establishment" humanitarian agency representing Swiss and
Western values and approaches, or whether it should instead become
a spokesman for "mankind" that employs new and perhaps radical
approaches in a quest for greater protection of human values (pp.
228-42).
The challenge of evaluating law involves critical review of both
the utility of international law as an instrument for the protection of

March 1981]

Restraints on War

1007

human rights and the role of the I.C.R.C. in developing humanitarian law. Forsythe is troubled by the emphasis in contemporary international law on the rights and prerogatives of sovereign states. He
finds an excessive deference to the rights of states. This, of course, is
not surprising given the present decentralized international lawmaking process wherein states make, interpret, and apply the law for
themselves. Forsythe thinks that the task of developing and supervising more of this kind of law, always with proper deference to the
rights of sovereign states, is an insufficient challenge for the I.C.R.C.
Forsythe believes the I.C.R.C. should transcend legal purposes and
methods to emphasize ad hoc diplomacy on behalf of human rights,
rather than organize more conferences to produce conventional humanitarian law and exert more efforts to implement that law (pp.
242-45). A prominent example of this ad hoc diplomacy is provided
in the record of I. C.R. C. involvement on behalf of political prisoners
during the "colonels'" regime in Greece from 1967-1974 (pp. 76-84).
Forsythe's chaP.ters on prote~tion of political prisoners and intervention in cases of hijacking, kidnapping, and other situations not
covered by international law offer further examples of this ad hoc
diplomatic approach.
Finally, Forsythe explores the challenge of moral choice that
faces the I.C.R.C. He distinguishes between three forms of humanitarianism: impartial, international, and revolutionary (p. 227). Impartial humanitarianism, the typical practice of the I.C.R.C. and the
UN High Commission for Refugees, is based on a theory of "discreet
incrementalism," the "one more blanket" theory of doing what one
can to alleviate suffering. Two working premises underlie this approach: the humanitarian organization should operate with the consent of the government having jurisdiction over the persons
requiring protection, and the organization should rarely if ever criticize that government in public. There is a tradeo.ff between practical
relief and initiatives that might pressure those in control of the persons who are in need of assistance to drastically change their policies. International humanitarianism, typified by Amnesty
International, operates with consent of the government with jurisdiction over the persons to be protected at some times and without that
government's consent at others. Under this approach, the
humanitarian organization does not hesitate to criticize or to seek
fundamental changes in the state of affairs that has produced the
need to provide protection. Revolutionary humanitarianism, typified by the Joint Church Aid (JCA) organization's activities in the
Biafra War in Nigeria, disregards the wishes and claims of public
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authorities and does whatever it can both to ameliorate and to eliminate the conditions requiring humanitarian intervention.
The moral challenge to the I.C.R.C. is whether to continue to
pursue "discreet humanitarianism," impartial humanitarianism, or
move in the direction of international or revolutionary humanitarianism. Forsythe's own recommendations are twofold. First, he
thinks that "the ICRC should move to make Geneva law more effective and more oriented to human needs rather than state interests,
when the two values are divergent" (p. 244). He gives as an example
the I.C.R.C. position on the 1977 Geneva Protocols discussed above
in the review of Draper's essay. 14 Like this Reviewer, Forsythe
would have urged that one Protocol should govern all armed conflict. This was the original position of the I.C.R.C. However, it ultimately bowed to the wishes of the governments participating in the
Diplomatic Conference, even though the second Protocol, which
governed noninternational conflicts, offered quite inferior humanitarian protections to the first, which governed internal conflicts.
Finally, Forsythe contends that "the ICRC should move to make
as much of its work as possible alegal" (p. 244). In terms that will
surely shake the traditional image of both the role of humanitarian
law and the I.C.R.C., Forsythe argues:
This "delegalization" process would counteract certain claims by states
- viz., that the law did not apply, that the law only required X but not
Y, that use of the law led to implications about the overall nature of
the situation that the state wished to avoid. In many situations an
ICRC alegal, purely humanitarian approach might produce considerable humanitarian results. Geneva law should be regarded as a necessary
evil and a last resort, useful in some but not all situations (emphasis added). [P. 244.]

Conclusion

In these two important contributions to the literature of the law
of war and limited war, Howard and his associates and Forsythe
demonstrate the interaction of normative and policy restraints on
war. At a time of great interest in revival and improvement of the
law of war - or, as it is increasingly called, the law of international
and/or noninternational conflict - it is imperative for moralists,
lawyers, scholars of political/military policy, and decision makers to
ponder the choice of strategies in developing restraints on war.
Howard's volume shows the critical relationship between political/military policies and capabilities and normative restraint. The
14. See text at notes 4-10.rupra.
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essays suggest that it may prove more helpful to develop tacit, informal ground rules of conflict rather than to attempt to codify international law restrictions on belligerent means of destruction.
Forsythe penetrates into the "holy of holies" of the law of war Red Cross, Geneva, humanitarian law - and suggests that political
approaches, based on moral objectives and transcending both law
and legal techniques of restraint, may offer the best strategy to protect human rights. Together, the two books provide indispensable
discussions, discussions on which those interested in restraint on war
should reflect profoundly if this most difficult enterprise is to have a
chance of influencing the dangerous trend of contemporary conflict.

